

Going Atomic

**The Strengths and Weaknesses of a
Technique-centric Purple Teaming Approach**



Alfie Champion @ajpc500

Atomic Purple Team?

\$ whoami

- Adversary Emulation
- Previously MWR / F-Secure

- Previously Spoken at BH, RSA, T2.fi
- C3, Cobalt Strike, Mythic, Nim



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Offense

Informs

Defense

Red Team

Informs

Defense


Table Top

Informs

Defense

**Atomic Purple
Team?**


Objective-Led Attack Path



Objective-Led Attack Path

- Emulation potentially down to a procedural level ✓
- Evidence-based appraisal of defence against a given threat ✓
- Potential to exercise response playbooks and processes ✓


Initial
Access



HTML attachment
smuggling ISO
containing DOCM file T1566.001

Link in body of email T1566.002

Email attachment with
LNK in ISO in ZIP T1566.001






**What should we
execute?**


What should we execute?

Sources of techniques:

- Threat Intelligence
- Incident Write-ups
- Offensive Testing Outputs
- Security Tooling Capability



What should we execute?



[P]

Operator Enterprise 1.5.3

CONNECT

Filter the agents below

- privateducky
- Launch chain
- My profile
- View queue
- Reverse shell
- Delete agent

Search the results

2022/05/1/08:55:03	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/08:55:03	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/08:53:46	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/08:53:46	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/08:53:46	Who am I, really?	shipped
2022/05/1/08:53:46	Who am I, really?	shipped
2022/05/1/08:50:39	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/08:50:38	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:56:50	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:54:22	Who am I, really?	sh
2022/05/1/07:42:10	simple name	shipped
2022/04/28/17:41:50	simple name	sh
2022/05/28/17:34:00	simple name	shipped
2022/05/28/17:12:00	do things	shipped
2022/05/28/17:11:20	do things	shipped
2022/05/28/17:09:40	do things	shipped
2022/05/28/17:07:30	do things	shipped

SETTINGS

Add agents 1/50

tactic:discovery name:python

- Create a new TTP
Click here to create a new TTP and attach it to your chain. [create](#)
- Use Python to enumerate domain users
Enumerate the users of a domain. [ttp](#)
- Port Scan using python
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python. [ttp](#)
- Use Python to enumerate Service Principal Names
Find the Service Principal Names associated with a user account. [ttp](#)
- Grab python version
Determine the current python version for python in the current PATH. [ttp](#)

T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery

The attacker will attempt to discovery who is a member of the privileged “Domain Admins” Active Directory group.



```
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
```



```
Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins"
```



```
AdFind.exe -b "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=Contoso,DC=com" member
```




```
ldapsearch "CN=Domain Admins" member
```

T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery



```
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
```

T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery



34 lines (34 sloc) | 1.03 KB

Raw Blame

```
1 title: Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity
2 id: d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0
3 status: experimental
4 description: Detects suspicious command line activity on Windows systems
5 author: Florian Roth, omkar72, @svch0st
6 date: 2019/01/16
7 modified: 2022/06/09
8 references:
9   - https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/
10  - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/
11 tags:
12   - attack.discovery
13   - attack.t1087.001
14   - attack.t1087.002
15 logsource:
16   category: process_creation
17   product: windows
18 detection:
19   selection:
20     CommandLine|contains:
21     - net group "domain admins"
22     - net localgroup administrators
23     - net group "enterprise admins"
24     - net accounts /do
25   condition: selection
26 fields:
27   - CommandLine
28   - ParentCommandLine
29 falsepositives:
30   - Inventory tool runs
31   - Administrative activity
32 analysis:
33   recommendation: Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM)
34 level: medium
```

T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery

A small icon representing a terminal window, consisting of a dark gray square with a white right-pointing arrow and a white horizontal line to its right.

```
set GROUP="Domain Admins" /domain  
n^e^t g^r^o^u^p %GROUP% /d^o
```

T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery




```
ldapsearch "CN=Domain Admins" member
```




Technique
Sophistication*

Technique Prevalence

**What data should we be
collecting?**



Telemetry




Alerting




Prevention


Applying Results



Applying Results



Applying Results




Performance Benchmarking



- Data-driven evidence of detective/preventative improvement.
- **Challenge:** TTPs evolve over time.
- **Challenge:** Importance of tests chosen.

Environment Comparison



- Is there variance in your capability across regions?
Across endpoint builds? On-premise vs. Virtualised?
- **Challenge:** Relevance of TTPs across infrastructure.

Return on Investment



- Out of the box detections? Custom rule capability?
Are we getting the most out of what we've paid for?
- **Challenge:** Raw Telemetry != Viable Alert.
- **Challenge:** DCSync > Whoami

Industry Comparison



- Benchmark comparison against your peers.
- **Challenge:** Pleasing senior leadership!
- **Challenge:** Experience in capability development.

Weaknesses of Atomic Testing

- Plays into a 'MITRE ATT&CK Whac-A-Mole' mindset



- Doesn't test response playbooks and processes



- Good 'atomic' performance isn't the whole story



- Maturity required to gain value and digest results



Takeaways

**Atomic testing can inform strategy,
prioritisation and investment.**

**Atomic testing is invaluable to
detection engineering.**

**The relevance of test cases to
real-world threats is crucial.**

**Automation makes atomic
testing scalable and repeatable.**

**Atomic testing is not a replacement
for other offensive testing.**

Questions?



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ajpc500.github.io

